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Pool it, Share it, Use it: The European Council 
on Defence 
Sven Biscop 
The December 2013 European Council will 
address the Common Security and Defence 
Policy  (CSDP).  Pooling  &  Sharing  of 
military  capabilities  will  be  high  on  the 
agenda. What should be expected from the 
Heads  of  State  and  Government? 
Capabilities now, capabilities in the future, 
and a common idea on what to use them 
for. 
When the European Council decides to devote 
its precious time to the CSDP, it can only mean 
that  the  stakes  are  high.  European  defence 
definitely needs another major push.  
 
Back  in  2010,  the  Foreign  and  Defence 
Ministers  set  a  dynamic  in  motion,  launching 
the “Ghent Initiative” for Pooling & Sharing of 
military  capabilities.  That  ball  has  rolled  its 
course  without  as  yet  producing  a  real 
breakthrough. Pooling & Sharing initiatives do 
not  come  close  to  making  good  the  defence 
cuts resulting from austerity budgets. That does 
not  prevent  Europeans  from  assuming 
responsibility for security in their near abroad, 
in  Libya  and  most  recently  in  Mali.  But  they 
struggle to do so and continue to rely heavily 
on  American  enablers.  But j ust  now 
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Washington  is  making  it  clear  that  it  really 
expects  Europeans  to  deal  with  their 
neighbourhood on their own.  
 
It is not for the European Council to deal 
with the minutiae of capability development. 
Making Chefsache of the CSDP, the Heads of 
State and Government can use their political 
authority  to  set  the  national  defence 
establishments  to  work,  with  the  support  of 
the  EU  institutions,  and  oblige  them  to 
achieve  results.  The  desired  output  is 
threefold: capabilities now, capabilities in the 
future,  and  a  common  idea o n  w h a t  t o  u s e  
them for.  
 
CAPABILITIES, PLEASE!  
The  European  Council  takes  European 
defence seriously, or it would not put it on the 
agenda. For our publics and partners to do the 
same, the first thing is to demonstrate that its 
indispensable processes, institutions and long-
term plans do generate tangible capabilities. In 
public diplomacy terms, the only eye-catcher at 
the  European  Council  can b e  the  launch  of 
one or more major projects.  
 
That would be none too soon, for by the 
time of its meeting, it will be a full two years 
after the Foreign Affairs Council in December 
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2011  prioritized  eleven  “specific  concrete” 
projects  for  Pooling  &  Sharing,  focussing o n  
key  enablers.  Important  progress  has  been 
achieved:  a  Helicopter  Training  Programme 
and  a  European  Satellite  Communications 
Procurement  Cell  have  been  established e . g . , 
and Letters of Intent signed by fifteen countries 
on  field  hospitals  and  by  ten  on  air-to-air 
refuelling.  
 
Yet, to make a difference most projects need 
both  widening  and  deepening:  more  Member 
States should join in further-reaching cooperation. 
That is the case for air-to-air refuelling, at least 
if the objective is a substantial European fleet 
that  would  effectively  reduce  dependence  on 
US  assets.  In  other  areas,  as  the  European 
Defence Agency (EDA) notes, Member States 
have yet to act: smart munitions, future military 
satellites,  and  intelligence,  surveillance  and 
reconnaissance.
1 And there are important areas 
beyond those prioritized by the Council, such 
as drones, in which European cooperation is of 
the essence to achieve critical mass for projects 
now being envisaged by one or a few Member 
States.  
 
Will  the  momentum  created  by  the 
December 2013 rendez-vous suffice to convince 
more Member States to sign up?  
 
In the end the capitals must come forward, 
but the EU institutions can stimulate and guide 
the on-going dynamic debate. It certainly is in 
the interest of Britain and France to take the 
lead. As they deploy the most, they more than 
others directly feel the lack of enablers. If they 
can muster the vision, they have the weight to 
launch major initiatives, but not the scale to see 
them  through  – n o t  e v e n  t o g e t h e r .  That 
requires  more  Member  States  to  participate, 
which is in their interest too. Not only are they 
even more denuded of enabling capacity, but 
contributing part of a key enabler would be one 
step  towards  regaining  the  influence  in 
decision-making  which  increasingly  they  are 
losing  for  lack  of  meaningful  capabilities t o  
bring to the table.  
 
The budgetary reality remains though that 
most Member States, big and small alike, are 
cutting  defence  budgets.  How  to  convince 
them to cut even deeper in order to free up the 
means  to  contribute  to  essential  collective 
European projects?  
 
The  European  dynamic  can  be 
reinvigorated  by  stimulating  cooperation  at 
cluster  level  and  directing  it  towards  the 
European  goals.  In  several o f  t h e s e  (smaller 
and  overlapping)  groups  of  Member  States 
there  is  today  a  strong  dynamic  towards 
deepening  the  cooperation.  Urged  on  by 
austerity budgets, the Baltic, Benelux, Nordic 
and  Visegrad  countries,  the  Netherlands  and 
Germany, the Benelux, France and Germany 
in EATC, and Britain and France most notably 
are  taking  very  concrete  steps  to  maintain 
relevant  capabilities  by  Pooling  &  Sharing 
them. Indeed, pooling what you have does not 
get  you  more.  But  launching  new  capability 
projects,  particularly  for  strategic  enablers, 
surpasses the capacity of any individual cluster.  
 
More synergy between the clusters and the 
collective  European  level  is  the  obvious 
answer. The most performing clusters – which 
simply  means t h o s e  t h a t  w a n t  t o  b e  s e e n  a s  
such  – c a n  be  encouraged  to  accelerate  the 
deepening of their cooperation, and to use the 
European  Council  as  a  platform  both  to 
highlight  their  achievements  and  intentions 
and  at  the  same  time t o  a n n o u n c e  a  
contribution  to  some  of  the  major  collective 
projects. This might also induce clusters that 
have  so  far  engaged  much  less  in  actual 
Pooling & Sharing of capabilities and Member 
States  that  have  remained  somewhat  outside 
the cluster dynamic, to commit more.  
 
To make it very concrete: Belgium and the 
Netherlands  e.g.  have  to  all  intents  and 
purposes  integrated  their  navies.  It  makes 
perfect sense to apply the same model to their   3 
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air  forces:  keeping  national  platforms  with 
national crews, but supported by a bi-national 
command  structure  and  bi-national  or 
specialized logistics, maintenance and training, 
all concentrated on a single base each for all 
transport and all combat capacity. Equally far-
reaching integration, incorporating Germany as 
well, is possible between their airmobile forces. 
Nothing  less  than  such  ambitious  Pooling  & 
Sharing schemes will guarantee the survival of 
significant expeditionary capabilities and, after 
the  initial  investment,  create  some  budgetary 
margin to over several years pledge to collective 
European projects to acquire strategic enablers. 
That ambition and that pledge Belgium and the 
Netherlands,  and  others,  could  announce  in 
December.  
 
WE’RE IN FOR THE LONG HAUL  
More than a deadline, December should be a 
starting point. In order to ensure continued and 
systematic attention for European defence and 
effective  implementation  of  all  plans  and 
intentions,  the  European  Council  should 
launch a process, deciding on the tasking and 
on a mechanism for reporting and evaluation.  
 
A  point  of  departure  and  a  logical 
complement  to  urging  Member  States  to 
implement in the short term the eleven projects 
that they already prioritized in 2011, is to task a 
reflection  about  which  further  capabilities 
Europeans aim to develop in the long term, by 
2030  and  beyond.  The  capabilities  that  are 
coming  on-line  today  and  over t h e  next  few 
years (the A400M, the NH90 and others) have 
all been initiated decades ago. For more than a 
decade  now  however  few  if  any  new  major 
initiatives have been taken, as the focus was on 
immediate  requirements  necessitated  by 
operations  in  Afghanistan  especially.  Dealing 
with wear and tear of equipment (and did we 
not all plan as if there is no such thing) and 
with threats such as IEDs left neither budgetary 
nor  mental  space  for  much  else.  If  new 
collective  programmes  are  to  yield  collective 
capabilities (and there is no other way) by 2030-
2040,  the  time  to  start  thinking  about  this  is 
now.  
 
Such a reflection should involve the political 
level,  directly  involving  the  actual  decision-
makers, rather than risking political attention to 
slip  by  relegating  it  to  working  groups  of 
officials or even to a wise pen group of some 
sort.  The  European  Council  could  task  the 
High  Representative,  as  Chair  of  the  Foreign 
Affairs  Council,  to  organize  this  reflection  at 
ministerial level and to report back in a year’s 
time, with the aim from the start to continue 
the  process  afterwards.  To  trigger  debate, 
concrete  and  innovative  input  papers  can  be 
tasked  to  the  EUMC  at  CHOD-level,  to  the 
EDA, and perhaps to a wise pen group (rather 
than entrusting such with the reflection itself).  
 
Starting from a quite concrete question, such 
a  strategic-level  reflection  can  generate  more 
permanent  and  structured  ways  of  thinking 
about defence planning among Member States, 
ultimately leading to harmonization.  
 
To  continue  with  the  Benelux  example: 
though they might not advertise it, Belgium and 
the  Netherlands  even  today  no  longer  do 
national naval planning. Any unilateral decision 
that  would  reduce  the  existing  level  of 
cooperation,  e.g.  the  choice  of  a  different 
platform,  would  incur  prohibitive  costs,  for 
neither can afford to regenerate installations for 
logistics and maintenance that it closed down 
and entrusted to the other. As various clusters 
deepen cooperation in various capability areas, 
de  facto  Member  States  will  end  up 
harmonizing planning for each particular area 
with the concerned cluster partners.  
 
The  next  step  is  that  Member  States  go 
beyond this “tactical” level of coordination, per 
capability area, and move to the strategic level: 
coordination of defence planning as a whole. 
This step will follow gradually yet automatically 
from  the  reflection  about  new  long  term 
capability  objectives.  Any  major  project   4 
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resulting from it will require a critical mass of a 
dozen  or  more  Member  States.  Those  most 
willing to commit are likely to be the very same 
Member States that are already the most engaged 
in several overlapping and ever more integrated 
clusters e a c h .  Managing  the  resulting  complex 
puzzle (of capabilities offered by several smaller 
clusters,  enablers  generated  by  only  one  larger 
cluster  each,  and  of  course  remaining  national 
capabilities) will inevitably lead to coordination 
at a level above the various individual clusters.  
 
Likely  therefore  the  most  engaged  Member 
States in Pooling & Sharing will come together 
and create a permanent and structured dialogue 
about their national defence planning. Only thus 
can they ensure: (1) that they are all building the 
puzzle from the same box top image, i.e. the set 
of capabilities which they decide that collectively 
(but  not  necessarily  each  individually)  they 
require;  (2)  that  no  piece  of  the  puzzle  is 
missing, i.e. that all shortfalls are addressed; and 
(3) that there are no superfluous pieces, i.e. that 
redundancies are done away with.  
 
Such a permanent dialogue can be supported 
by a formal group within the EDA, without the 
need to create new institutions or activate the 
Protocol on Permanent Structured Cooperation, 
but  to  which  Member  States  send  the  real 
decision-makers. It is in fact exactly the sort of 
collective top-down guidance which the creation 
of the EDA aimed at, but which until now never 
happened.  The  EDA  can  furthermore  assist 
them  by  systematically  assessing  draft  national 
defence  planning  and  white  books  from  the 
collective European perspective. Within such a 
group,  trust  can  be  reinforced  by  pledging 
specific sums or a share of the defence budget 
(as  proposed  by  General  Hakan  Syren  as 
outgoing  Chairman  of  the  EUMC)
2 t o  t h e  
realization  of  selected  major  projects  for  a 
certain  period.  Furthermore,  in  dual-use 
capability  areas  some  projects  could  also  be 
launched and led by the Commission.  
 
Any Member State can join this dialogue at 
any time, but the key is that those that are the 
most active in Pooling & Sharing already take 
the initiative.  
 
POOL IT TO USE IT  
What  is  the  box  top  image  that  would 
convince  Member  States  to  buy  the  puzzle? 
What  is  the  European  capability  mix  that 
Member States will want to be a part of?  
 
The  detailed  list  of  European  capability 
requirements  and  shortfalls  has  been 
established well over a decade ago, based on a 
translation into five illustrative scenarios of the 
1999  Headline  Goal  of  projecting  an  army 
corps, itself based on an extrapolation of the 
Balkans  experience  in  the  preceding  years. 
Since  then,  Europeans  have  deployed  far 
beyond  the  Balkans,  for  operations  ranging 
from  humanitarian  relief  to  war,  under 
different flags and in different constellations – 
which  alas  often  exposed  great  political 
differences.  The  implicit  geopolitical  map 
underlying European defence clearly no longer 
is up to date. More and more involved actors 
are  coming  to  advocate  that  the  European 
Council  surely  cannot  debate  capabilities 
without  any  reflection  about  what  it  is 
Europeans want to use these capabilities for.  
 
European thinking is in fact evolving fast. 
Already the French intervention in Mali gained 
far more political support from fellow Member 
States (though not necessarily translating into 
military  support)  than  the  Franco-British 
intervention in Libya. Collective awareness of 
the  interests  at  stake  in  specific  regions  and 
contingencies  is  growing,  as  of  the  fact  that 
with  US  strategic  attention  focussed  on  the 
Asia-Pacific  region,  either  Europeans 
themselves  will  take  charge  of  crisis 
management  in  their  near  abroad  (whether 
through NATO, CSDP or ad hoc coalitions) 
or nobody will. It is too early for sure to write 
this up in a European white book or similar. 
Nonetheless, the European Council can build 
on  this  momentum  and  agree  on  the  first   5 
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(non-exhaustive) elements of political guidance 
on  which  regions  and  which  types  of 
contingencies  Europeans  a  priori  want  to 
assume responsibility for, if necessary on their 
own.  
 
Even if only in a few paragraphs, a mention 
of interests as drivers of policy and an indication 
that  Europe  assumes  responsibility  for  peace 
and  security  in  the  broader  neighbourhood 
(including  the  Sahel  and  the  Horn  of  Africa, 
probably  the  Gulf,  and  perhaps  Central  Asia) 
and has a stake in global maritime security (and 
not  just  off  the  Somali  coast)  will  offer  most 
useful  political  guidance:  for  capability 
development,  contingency  planning  and 
intelligence,  as  well  as  for  the  full-scale 
preventive effort of the Union. If put to good 
use by all relevant actors, it will allow Europe to 
be  much  more  prepared  for  contingencies  in 
these  priority  regions,  and  ought  to  facilitate 
action  by  the  able  and  willing  Member  States, 
making use of the command structure that best 
fits the contingency, under the political aegis of 
the Union. It is crucial therefore for another 
dimension  of  the  December  European 
Council’s  agenda  as  well:  rapid  and  effective 
deployment  on  the  whole  spectrum  of  crisis 
management.  
 
As the reflection progresses, the tasking by 
the European Council of a full-scale European 
white book or defence review can result from 
it later, a sub-strategy to the European Security 
Strategy
3  setting  priorities  for  conflict 
prevention  and  crisis  management,  and 
detailing  the  institutional  and  capability 
implications.  The  yearbook  envisaged  by  the 
EDA can then form the basis for an annual 
“state  of  the  union”  in  defence  at t h e  
European Council. Not just the Heads of State 
and Government, but our publics as well will 
not take an interest in capabilities unless they 
have  ownership  of  the  reasons  why  we  not 
only need them, but use them. 
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